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This paper applies a N-ARDL framework to two longstanding inflation targeting policy regimes in 
order to assess the relation between oil prices dynamics and inflation expectations and the further 
consequences created by a proximal ZLB situation. The application is based on data from January 1994 
to June 2018 for New Zealand and the UK. We focus on oil price shocks as a variable of interest and 
this was found to have an asymmetric effect on inflation expectations. One further key finding is that 
the real effective exchange rate has significant impacts on inflation expectations and this is indicative 
of an exchange rate pass-through to inflation via an inflation expectations channel. In general, we find 
that inflation, exchange rate, money supply, output growth, unemployment and fiscal deficit/surplus 
have significant implications for inflation expectations. Inflation expectations are also influenced by 
their past behaviour indicating adaptive inflation expectations.  This study contributes to the debate on 
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1. Introduction:  
In this paper we explore the effects of zero lower bound interest rates (ZLB) on inflation targeting policy 
regimes. A key purpose of central bank independence is to achieve price stability based on a rules and 
discretion compromise in the context of a delegated committee-based decision making process 
(Svensson, 1996; Bernanke et al. 2001; Mishkin, 2000).2 The committee is given an inflation target 
(subject to parameters) and empowered to use tools such as short term nominal interest rates to achieve 
the target. A primary intention is to “anchor” inflationary expectations (Williams, 2014) through 
continuity, coherency and consistency in policy and through strategic communication (providing an 
iterative development of decision making through policy) as the economic environment evolves 
(Bernanke, 2001 and 2003; Morgan, 2009). Transparency and accountability are considered core 
institutional features for credible guidance. However, since the financial crisis, inflation targeting has 
been the subject of multiple critiques.3 For example, it has been argued that a primary focus on price 
stability and frequent small adjustments to short term interest rates led to neglect of other factors that 
may cause price and financial stability to diverge, and this was one reason why asset price inflation 
could create the pricing problems and default contagions that contribute to an escalating banking crisis 
(Borio and White, 2004). The subsequent development of macro-prudential policy is intended to rectify 
this problem. A macro-prudential policy orientation is intended to complement and not substitute for 
price stability policy tools. However, intuitively one would expect the efficacy of those tools to be 
affected by the environmental consequences that the new macro-prudentialism is intended to address 
(Schoenmaker, 2014). Analytically, one can distinguish between determinants of inflation and 
influences on inflationary expectations. In reality the two tend to bleed together in a purposive fashion 
via the anchoring effect.4 A situation of long term zero lower bound interest rates (ZLB) creates a new 
environment for both determinants and expectations, and thus for the received and currently available 
monetary policy tools intended to affect these.5 Clearly, there is a potential barrier or threshold effect at 
the zero lower bound, given that the IMF anticipates that interest rate cuts of 3-6% are necessary to 
address sudden major financial and economic recessions and ZLB implies an immediate shift to 
negative interest rates in such cases and a possible liquidity trap (see Agarwal and Krogstrup, 2019) . 
However, more generally and prior to any such problem of crisis, one would expect that ZLB affects 
the credibility of monetary policy and thus receptivity to attempts to influence price stability via 
expectations management.   
Our purpose, therefore, for inflation targeting policy regimes, is to test how inflationary expectations 
respond to a ZLB environment and whether inflation expectations become unanchored and hence more 
responsive to shocks to standard inflation determinants in a (proximal) ZLB environment. We employ 
a Nonlinear Autoregressive Distributed Lag (N-ARDL) framework to explore data for the UK and New 
Zealand. These two were selected since both are longstanding inflation targeting policy regimes and so 
provide an extended duration for data. Moreover, each can be decomposed into two periods: a pre 
proximal ZLB period and a proximal ZLB period, though the interest rates indicative of proximal are 
                                                          
2 Inter alia, proponents claim that inflation targeting is simple, transparent, flexible and makes policymakers more 
accountable to the public; it overcomes the problem of time-inconsistency (Mishkin, 2000), mitigates inflationary 
bias (Herrendorf, 1998), lowers risk premiums (Lee, 2011; Lanzafame, 2016), increases real wages (Seim and 
Zetterberg, 2013), reduces the output sacrifice (ratio) by increasing the credibility of monetary authority (Corbo 
et al. 2001; Chortareas et al. 2002), and contributes to fiscal discipline (Obstfeld (2014) Minea and Tapsoba, 
2014).  
3 There are longstanding critiques of the desirability and efficacy of inflation targeting in general (Angeriz and 
Arestis, 2008; Alpanda and Honig, 2014), but also specific claims that it has been fatally undermined by the global 
financial crisis (Frankel, 2012; Quiggin, 2012; and Sumner, 2012); various counterclaims have been made 
(Reichlin and Baldwin, 2013; Andersen et al. 2015). 
4 For the evolution of theory see Phelps (1967) and Friedman (1968) and most recently Marfatia (2018). 
5 One might also note that Bank of Japan, European Central Bank (ECB) and the Riksbank have opted for negative 
rates (Nasir, 2017). 
different. In New Zealand, the trigger was a cut to 2.5% and in the UK a cut to 0.5%. Drawing on 
monthly observations from January 1994 to June 2018 we apply a comprehensive empirical estimation 
exercise. Much of the analysis focus around oil price shocks as a variable of interest and this was found 
to have an asymmetric effect on inflation expectations that a N-ARDL framework is sufficiently 
sensitive to pick up. One key finding is that the real effective exchange rate has significant impacts on 
inflation expectations and this is indicative of an exchange rate pass-through to inflation via an inflation 
expectations channel. This is a relatively under-explored or researched avenue for statistical analysis 
and debate6. In general, our empirical results lead us to conclude that inflation, GDP, unemployment, 
the exchange rate and the state fiscal stance have significant implications for inflation expectations in 
the case of both countries. Moreover, inflation expectations appear to be influenced by their past 
behaviour, and this does have implications for anchoring based on adaptive inflation expectations. We 
provide further comment, explanation and findings in the subsequent analysis.  
The paper proceeds in five sections: a brief reprise of standard determinants of inflation and some 
comment on how inflationary expectations are shaped (Section 2), methodology and data (Section 3), 
analysis and findings (Section 4), and policy implications (Section 5).           
2. Determinants of inflation expectations and anchoring  
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, radicalised monetary policy has maintained historic low 
interest rates for an unprecedented period, and during that time inflation has also remained relatively 
low and fairly stable (Haldane, 2015; Nasir, 2017). Proximal ZLB conditions have been part of a new 
“normal”. Despite positive signalling through “forward guidance”, the UK (unlike the USA) has not 
begun the return to a prior historic “normal” range for interest rates. Arguably, communicative 
signalling has become ambiguous in the context of interest rate policy for the shaping of expectations-
related behaviour in the UK, and yet the breakdown in convention has not passed through to manifest 
consequences in terms of elevated inflation. This is a curious situation based on the assumed efficacy 
of past practice emanating from the Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee (if we again refer to 
Bernanke 2001, Obstfeld, 2014 etc). Clearly, ZLB is a relevant issue here. Once one approaches ZLB, 
then the expectations relation of interest rates becomes a matter of ambiguity since the behavioural 
response of market participants may be ambivalent. As such, in hypothesis terms, there is scope to test 
whether inflation expectations become more responsive to shocks in proximal ZLB conditions for 
longstanding inflation targeting countries. Put another way, in what sense can one refer to anchoring?   
Factors that define the dynamic of actual inflation are widely considered to influence inflationary 
expectations. Accordingly, this study focuses on the factors which are typically deemed to account for 
inflation and inflation expectations dynamics. There is extensive literature on the many determinants of 
inflation, but less for inflation expectations. Logically, what determines inflation must also influence 
the expectations of inflation, since information regarding the former feeds the latter (Armantier et al. 
2016). Determinants extend to encompass past inflation and aggregate demand and supply pressure 
(Gali and Gertler, 1999). This has tended to vary between countries. For example, Canova et al. (2007) 
report significant demand shocks in the US and supply shocks in the Euro Zone. A number of studies 
report mixed results for demand and supply shocks as determinants of inflation (contrast, McAdam and 
Willman, 2004; Boschia and Girardi, 2007; Norkute, 2015; and Lagoa, 2017).  
There is also contrasting evidence regarding the role and relevance of the state’s fiscal stance, the past 
behaviour of inflation (“inertia”), inflation expectations, money supply, and exchange rates in 
determining the dynamics of inflation expectations. Clearly, this creates scope for further study and this 
extends into a context of ZLB. In terms of relevant literature, Mehra and Herrington (2008) report that 
inflation and inflation expectations were affected by past inflation, expected inflation, supply (oil price) 
shocks and demand (unemployment) shocks. Similarly, Fuhrer (2011) reports only a short-run nexus 
                                                          
6 See Nasir et al (2019) 
between inflation and inflation expectations in the US. In contrast, Lagoa (2017) and Marfatia (2018) 
report an enduring nexus between inflation and inflation expectations in Europe. Posen (2011) provides 
further specifications focused on the UK. However, ZLB creates a new context. One might argue that 
if inflation expectations are and have continued to be well-anchored then recent exchange rate shocks 
in the UK would have caused neither inflation nor weak performance of Bank of England forecasts 
(Broadbent, 2017; Haldane, 2017 and Nasir, 2017b). We return to this in our findings.    
A number of studies have suggested that the money supply has important implications for inflation. For 
instance, Lu et al. (2017) report a positive impact of money supply on inflation. However, Su et al. 
(2016) reported mixed results and Hung and Thompson (2016) observe little relation. More pertinently 
we were unable to identify any work specifically focused on the link as a determinant of inflation or 
ZLB conditions. 
Exchange Rate Pass-Through (ERPT) to inflation can pose significant challenges to a monetary 
authority (Fraga et al. 2003, Nasir et al. 2019)7. Focusing on the Pre-GFC period, Mishkin and 
Savastano (2001), Eichengreen (2002) and Schmidt-Hebbel and Werner (2002), argue that increased 
credibility due to the adoption of inflation targeting might lead to a reduction of ERPT, keeping inflation 
expectations anchored in the face of depreciation. However, Forbes and various others (2015; 2016; 
Forbes et al. 2017; Nasir and Simpson, 2018; Nasir, 2018) find that ERPT persists in inflation targeting 
regimes. In a recent study on the Czech Republic, Nasir et al. (2019) reported that the ERPT has a 
significant impact on inflation expectations.  
One must also consider the potential inflationary consequences of the state’s fiscal stance and this too 
has undergone evolution during the period of ZLB. The empirical evidence regarding an enduring 
relation to fiscal stance is mixed (Fischer et al. 2002; Catao and Terrones, 2005; and Lin and Chu, 
2013). Intuitively one might expect fiscal discipline to be a precondition for well-managed expectations 
and thus for effective inflation targeting (Mikek, 2004; Alpanda and Honig, 2014; Minea and Tapsoba, 
2014). This too warrants further exploration in a period of ZLB.8 Of similar interest is observable 
“inertia” or persistence in the periodization of inflation. Again, the evidence is mixed (contrast Corbo 
et al. 2001 and Gali and Gertler, 1999). Yigit (2010) reports a significant reduction once inflation 
targeting is adopted. However, ZLB may change the context in which this arises.  
So, there are multiple factors to consider as determinants of inflation that may be relevant for inflation 
expectations and that may be operative in inflation targeting regimes. ZLB provides a particular 
environment for these. Our question is whether inflation expectations remains anchored in the face of 
shocks experienced in a monetary policy condition proximal to ZLB.   
3.1 Methodology  
A  Nonlinear Auto-Regressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) framework is employed to analyse the shocks 
to inflation and inflation expectations caused by their potential determinants. This relationship can be 
specified in the form of an open economy New-Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC); -  
𝜋𝑡 = 𝛽𝜋𝜋𝑡−𝑖 + 𝛽𝐸𝜋𝐸𝜋𝑡+𝑖 + 𝛽𝑂𝑖𝑙(𝑂𝑖𝑙)𝑡−𝑖 +  𝛽𝑂𝐺𝑂𝐺𝑡−𝑖 +  𝛽𝐿𝑀𝑆𝐿𝑀𝑆𝑡−𝑖 + 𝛽𝐹𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝐹𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑡−𝑖
+    𝛽𝐸𝑥𝐸𝑋𝑡−𝑖 + 𝛽𝑀𝑆𝑀𝑆𝑡−𝑖 + 𝑒𝑡          (1) 
                                                          
7 See, Engel and West (2005) for insightful discussion on the exchange rate role in predicting output, inflation, 
money supply and interest rates.  
8 In a couple of remarkable studies on Brazil, Minella et al. (2003) and later Cerisola and Gelos (2009) find that 
fiscal policy is an important factor in influencing inflation expectations. Importantly, they claim that since the 
adoption of inflation targeting, inflation expectations have been anchored and this has extended into a period of 
uncertainty. 
Where the inflation (𝜋𝑡) is determined by its past values (persistence element,𝜋𝑡−𝑖), its expectations 
(𝐸𝜋), output or GDP growth (𝑂𝐺), labour market slack or spare capacity (𝐿𝑀𝑆), fiscal stance 
(deficit/surplus), supply/cost (Oil) shocks, Money Supply (MS) and exchange rate pass-through (𝐸𝑋). 
Given that these factors are standard theory and often empirically established as the main determinants 
of inflation, we highlight these as influencers of inflationary expectations and their dynamics9. Hence,  
𝐸𝜋𝑡+𝑖 = 𝛽𝜋𝜋𝑡−𝑖 + 𝛽𝐸𝜋𝐸𝜋𝑡−𝑖 + 𝛽𝑂𝑖𝑙(𝑜𝑖𝑙)𝑡−𝑖 +  𝛽𝑂𝐺𝑂𝐺𝑡−𝑖 +  𝛽𝐿𝑀𝑆𝐿𝑀𝑆𝑡−𝑖 + 𝛽𝐹𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝐹𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑡−𝑖
+  𝛽𝐸𝑥𝐸𝑋𝑡−𝑖 + 𝛽𝑀𝑠𝑀𝑆𝑡−𝑖 +   𝑒𝑡              (2) 
Where the inflation expectations (𝐸𝜋𝑡) are influenced by its past values (persistence element,𝐸𝜋𝑡−𝑖), 
actual prevailing inflation (𝜋), output or GDP growth (𝑂𝐺), labour market slack or spare capacity 
(𝐿𝑀𝑆), fiscal stance (deficit/surplus), supply/cost (Oil) shocks, Money Supply (MS) and exchange rate 
pass-through (𝐸𝑋)10. We employ a N-ARDL model because such an approach takes into account both 
asymmetries and nonlinearities (Pesaran and Shin, 1999; Pesaran et al. 2001; Shin et al. 2011). We take 
the potential for these to be important in exploring ZLB and inflation targeting. As such, N-ARDL is 
an appropriate framework of analysis. To begin, we specify the Eq. (1 & 2) in the following long-run 
model of inflation and inflation expectations:  
𝜋𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝑂𝑖𝑙𝑡
+ + 𝑎2𝑂𝑖𝑙𝑡
− +  𝑎3𝐸𝜋𝑡 + 𝑎4𝑂𝐺𝑡 +  𝑎5𝐿𝑀𝑆𝑡 +  𝑎6𝐹𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑡 +   𝑎7𝐸𝑋𝑡 + 𝑎8𝑀𝑆𝑡 +
 𝑒𝑡         (3) 
𝐸𝜋𝑡+𝑖 = 𝑎0 +  𝑎1𝑂𝑖𝑙𝑡
+ + 𝑎2𝑂𝑖𝑙𝑡
− + 𝑎3𝜋𝑡 +  𝑎4𝑂𝐺𝑡 + 𝑎5𝐿𝑀𝑆𝑡 + 𝑎6𝐹𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑡 +  𝑎7𝐸𝑋𝑡 +
𝑎8𝑀𝑆𝑡 +   𝑒𝑡        (4) 
Where 𝜋𝑡 is inflation and 𝐸𝜋𝑡 are inflation expectations and their determinants are as specified in 
equation (1 & 2), 𝑎 = (𝑎0 −  𝑎8) is a co-integrating vector of long-run parameters. Supply-side or cost 
shocks arise most clearly in terms of oil prices, since these are fundamental to economic activity. In Eq. 
(3 & 4) the  𝑂𝑖𝑙𝑡
+ and 𝑂𝑖𝑙𝑡
− are partial sums of positive and negative changes in oil prices (expressed for 
crude in the representative West Texas Intermediate pricings). This can be specified as:  
𝑂𝑖𝑙𝑡
+ =  ∑ ∆𝑂𝑖𝑙𝑖
+𝑡
𝑖=1 =  ∑ max (∆𝑂𝑖𝑙𝑖, 0)
𝑡
𝑖=1  (5) 
and  
𝑂𝑖𝑙𝑡
− =  ∑ ∆𝑂𝑖𝑙𝑖
−𝑡
𝑖=1 =  ∑ min (∆𝑂𝑖𝑙𝑖, 0)
𝑡
𝑖=1  (6) 
Given the formulation presented above (Eq. 3 & 4), the relationship between oil price shocks  (𝑂𝑃)  
and inflation expectations (𝐸𝜋𝑡) is expected to be positive (𝑎1). However, 𝑎2 captures the association 
between oil prices and inflation expectations when there are reductions in those oil prices. As the oil 
price and its expectations are expected to show co-movement, estimates of 𝑎2 are expected to have 
positive signs.  Furthermore, we also posit that the increasing relation is greater than the decreasing one. 
That is, an increase in the oil price will lead to a more pronounced increase in inflation expectations 
when contrasted with the dampening effect on expectations of a decrease in the oil price. In simple 
terms, the asymmetry is expressed as: positive shocks will have a greater impact than negative shocks 
                                                          
9 Given that the focus of the paper is inflation expectations rather actual inflation, we did not report the 
estimation result of equation 1. However, despite the fact that the Equation 1 is empirically and theoretically 
well explored and established, we still performed the estimation of equation 1 using System GMM to make sure 
that the nexus between inflation expectations → inflation is robust in the subject case. The results are not 
presented here to conserve the space, but are available on request.    
10 To empirically establish the link between inflation expectations and real exchange rate i.e. exchange rate pass 
through to inflation expectation, we employed the system-GMM and VAR Granger causality test. Both 
approaches empirical demonstrated that real exchange rate causes inflation expectations at 1% significance 
level. To conserve the space, these results are also not presented here but are available on request.  
i.e. 𝑎1 >  𝑎2. This implies downward price rigidity, reflected in inflation expectations. Concomitantly, 
the long run relationship presented in Eq. (3 & 4) is expected to reflect an asymmetric pass through.  At 
this juncture, we can frame Eq. 3 and 4 in a N-ARDL setting (see, Shin et al. (2011) Pesaran and Shin 
(1999) and Pesaran et al. (2001) as follows:  
∆𝜋𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝛽1𝜋𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑂𝑃𝑡−1
+ + 𝛽3𝑂𝑃𝑡−1
− +  𝛽4𝐸𝜋𝑡−1 +  𝛽5𝑂𝐺𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝐹𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑡−1





























+   𝑒𝑡          (7) 
And  
∆𝐸𝜋𝑡+𝑖 = 𝑎 + 𝛽1𝐸𝜋𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑂𝑃𝑡−1
+ + 𝛽3𝑂𝑃𝑡−1
− + 𝛽4𝜋𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝑂𝐺𝑡−1 +  𝛽6𝐿𝑆𝑡−1 +  𝛽7𝐹𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑡−1





























  𝑒𝑡         (8) 
All the variables are as previously defined, whilst 𝑝, q, s, v, w , x , 𝑧, 𝑚 are lag orders and 𝑎1 = −𝛽2/𝛽1 
𝑎2 = −𝛽3/𝛽1 are the earlier mentioned long run impacts of increase/decrease oil shocks on inflation 
(Eq. 7) and the impact of increase/decrease in oil prices on inflation expectations (Eq.8). In Eq. 7, 
∑ 𝜃𝑖
+𝑞
𝑖=0 measures the short-run impacts of an increase in oil prices on inflation whereas ∑ 𝜃𝑖
−𝑞
𝑖=0  
measures the short run impacts of a decrease in oil prices on inflation. In Eq. 8  ∑ 𝜃𝑖
+𝑞
𝑖=0 measures the 
short-run impacts of an increase in oil prices on inflation expectations whereas ∑ 𝜃𝑖
−𝑞
𝑖=0  measures the 
short run impacts of a decrease in oil prices on inflation expectations. In this setting, we capture the 
asymmetric long-run as well as asymmetric short run relationship between oil prices and inflation 
expectations.  
We implement this N-ARDL framework following several steps. First, we perform a unit root test to 
determine the order integration of the underlying data series. Whilst the N-ARDL approach to co-
integration is valid whether the series are 𝐼 (0) or 𝐼 (1), it is still important to perform a unit root test 
to confirm that there is no 𝐼 (2) variable. This is because 𝐼 (2) invalidates the computation of F-statistics 
to test co-integration (Ibrahim, 2015). We perform a standard ADF unit root test but with structural 
break to find the order of integration. Thereafter, we estimate Equation 7 & 8 using the OLS method. 
After estimation of our N-ARDL model, we apply the bound testing approach proposed by Pesaran et 
al. (2001) and Shin et al. (2011) to test for the presence of co-integration of the underlying data series. 
In so doing, we perform the Wald F-test with the null hypothesis, 𝛽1 = 𝛽2 = 𝛽3 = 𝛽4 = 𝛽5 = 𝛽6 =
𝛽7 = 𝛽8 = 𝛽9 = 0.  In a final step we examine the long and short run asymmetries in the relationship 
between oil price shocks and inflation expectations, which provides the grounds for subsequent 
discussion of the impact of other explanatory variables in the model. With specific reference to inflation 
expectations, we derive the asymmetric cumulative dynamic multiplier effects of a 1% change in the 
oil prices i.e. 𝑂𝑃𝑡−1
+  and 𝑂𝑃𝑡−1













𝑗=0 , ℎ = 0,1,2 … … . ..   (10) 
A point to note here is that as ℎ → ∞, 𝑚ℎ
+  →  𝑎1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑚ℎ
−  →  𝑎2 . 
3.2 Data 
As stated in the introduction, we selected data for the UK and New Zealand. These two were chosen 
since both are longstanding inflation targeting policy regimes and so provide an extended duration for 
data. We draw on monthly observations extending from January 1994 to June 2018 and apply a 
comprehensive empirical estimation exercise. However, the two data sets are not entirely synchronous. 
Based on availability, the time horizon of study for New Zealand is January 1994 to June 2017, whilst 
for the UK, December 1999 to June 2018. To match frequency, we performed linear interpolation for 
the monthly observations where necessary. Details of each proxy is as follows: 
Inflation Expectations: For New Zealand, we used monthly data collected through Business Surveys, 
including all sectors inflation expectations. The data is collected by the Australia and New Zealand 
Banking Group. For the UK, we collected data from the Bank of England’s survey on inflation 
expectations.  
Inflation: Both the Bank of England and Reserve Bank of New Zealand measure inflation using the 
monthly Consumer Price Index and we used the year on year percentage change in CPI.  
Supply /Cost (oil) Shocks: For oil prices, we collected data on crude oil prices (West Texas 
Intermediate, WTI).  We used the spot crude oil price which is in US$ per Barrel and internationally 
reported in the dominant currency. The data was retrieved from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.   
Output growth: We used data on real GDP growth for both New Zealand and the UK. The data was 
collected from the UK Office for National Statistics (ONS) and Statistics New Zealand. 
Labour Market (Unemployment): For the labour market and employment outlook we used data on 
the unemployment rate from the ONS and Statistics New Zealand.  
Fiscal Stance (Surplus/Deficit): Monthly data was used from the ONS public sector current budget 
deficit (excluding public sector banks) for the UK and the central government Deficit/Surplus published 
by the New Zealand Treasury. 
Real Exchange Rate: To represent the exchange rate, we used monthly data on the real effective 
exchange rate, collected from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS).  
Money supply: M3 was selected as the longest duration available monthly measure of broad money 
for both New Zealand and the UK. The reason to choose M3 is that it provides a more comprehensive 
and inclusive measure of the money supply. Nonetheless, it is also observed that despite the Large-
Scale Asset Purchases (A.k.a. Quantitative Easing or Q.E.) by the Bank of England, contrary to the 
high-powered money balances (M0), there was not a huge shift in the broad money supply M3. The 
data was collected from the ONS and Statistics New Zealand.  
4.1 Analysis, Findings and Discussion  
As previously stated, we performed an ADF unit root test with structural break to determine the order 
of integration of the series. Accounting for a structural break is important, since in the presence of a 
structural break, a confirming unit root test is prone to be biased towards the null of random walk 
(Ranganathan and Ananthakumar, 2010; Nasir et al. 2018). We let the date of the break be determined 
endogenously (allowing the data to speak). We chose the alternative minimize and maximise options to 
allow for evaluation of one-sided alternatives. This produces different critical values for the final 
Dickey-Fuller test statistic, appropriate in these circumstances since it tests with greater power than the 
non-directional alternatives11. The ADF tests for unit roots in the presence of breaks with both 
innovative outliers (IO) and additive outliers (AO)12. In order to choose the optimal number of lags for 
the ADF test, we used the Schwarz Information Criteria (SIC) which is particularly appropriate in the 
presence of a structural break (Asghar and Abid 2007). The results are presented in Table 1:  






ADF Test Statistic 
(AO) 
P-Values 
Level New Zealand       
 Inflation -4.088 0.144 -5.632* 0.014 
 Inflation Expectations -4.674 0.165 -4.650 0.173 
 GDP -5.302** 0.035 -5.305** 0.035 
 Unemployment  -4.625 0.183 -4.217 0.383 
 REER -3.895 0.591 -3.858 0.612 
 Oil Shocks -5.096 0.06 -5.011 0.076 
 Money Supply  -4.114 0.447 -4.192 0.399 
 Fiscal Deficit/Surplus -5.037 0.072 -5.075 0.065 
 United Kingdom      
 Inflation -3.657 0.734 -3.801 0.648 
 Inflation Expectations -4.912 0.095 -5.262** 0.039 
 GDP -6.019* < 0.01 -6.375 < 0.01 
 Unemployment  -7.073* < 0.01 -7.101* < 0.01 
 REER -3.718 0.696 -3.718 0.696 
 Oil Shocks -4.093 0.459 -4.141 0.431 
 Money Supply -3.935 0.564 -3.657 0.733 
 Fiscal Deficit/Surplus -9.216 < 0.01 -9.290* < 0.01 
1st 
Difference New Zealand      
 Inflation -7.127* < 0.01 -7.250* < 0.01 
 Inflation Expectations -14.811* < 0.01 -14.911* < 0.01 
 GDP -7.921* < 0.01 -10.185* < 0.01 
 Labour Market  -7.992* < 0.01 -9.274* < 0.01 
 REER -13.463* < 0.01 -13.564* < 0.01 
 Oil Shocks -12.401* < 0.01 -12.468* < 0.01 
 Money Supply  -16.695* < 0.01 -17.330 < 0.01 
 Fiscal Deficit/Surplus -6.285* < 0.01 -5.638** 0.024 
 United Kingdom      
 Inflation -13.254* < 0.01  -13.360* < 0.01 
 Inflation Expectations -6.466* < 0.01 -8.536* < 0.01 
 GDP -5.632* 0.014 -4.607** 0.032 
 Unemployment -7.114* < 0.01 -7.182* < 0.01 
 REER -14.141* < 0.01 14.272* < 0.01 
 Oil Shocks  -11.767* < 0.01 -11.878* <0.01 
 Money Supply  13.588* < 0.01 -14.356* < 0.01 
 Fiscal Deficit/Surplus -19.791 < 0.01 -22.745 < 0.01 
*1% level of significance ** 5% level of significance ***Vogelsang (1993) asymptotic one-sided p-values.   
                                                          
11 See, Zivot and Andrews (1992), Banerjee et al. (1992) and Vogelsang and Perron (1998).  
12 See, Fox (1972) and Tsay (1988).  
The results of the stated ADF unit root test indicate that the null of “no root” could not be rejected at a 
5% level of statistical significance. However, at the first difference, all the series for both countries 
were found to be stationary i.e. I (1)13. We now turn to the estimation of N-ARDL model (Eq. 8) for 
inflation expectations in New Zealand and the UK. 
4.2 New Zealand   
 Table 2 presents the results of bounds testing for nonlinear co-integration for New Zealand: 
Table 2: Bounds test for the Nonlinear Co-integration New Zealand (1994M1 – 2017M06) 
Dependent variable  F-statistics Lower-Bound (95%) Upper-Bound (95%) Conclusion  
Inflation Expectations (𝐸𝜋) 8.523* 2.11 3.15 Cointegration 
*1% level of significance ** 5% level of significance ***10% level of significance: Null hypothesis is that there 
is not cointegration i.e. 𝐻0 ∶ 𝛽1 = 𝛽2 = 𝛽3 = 𝛽4 = 𝛽5 = 𝛽6 = 𝛽7 = 𝛽8 = 𝛽9 = 0, whereas the alternative 
hypothesis is that there is cointegration i.e. 𝐻1 ∶ 𝛽1 = 𝛽2 = 𝛽3 = 𝛽4 = 𝛽5 = 𝛽6 = 𝛽7 = 𝛽8 = 𝛽9 ≠ 0.  
Bound testing finds that the critical values of the F-statistics were greater than upper bound at a 95% 
level of confidence, indicating strong evidence of co-integration in modelled inflation expectations (Eq. 
8). This implies that there is a long-run relationship between the variables under analysis. We, therefore, 
proceeded with the estimation and further analysis. We split the sample, April 2009. This was the point 
in time that the Reserve Bank of New Zealand decreased the policy rate (official cash) to an 
unprecedented level of 2.5%.14 Splitting the sample here allows us to differentiate between the response 
of inflation expectations to its explanatory factors in a pre-ZLB and proximal ZLB period. We estimated 
the model for the two sub-periods (January 1994 to March 2009 and April 2009 to June 2017). The 
results of our N-ARDL model for inflation expectations for the full and sub-samples are presented in 
Table 3:  
Table 3 Nonlinear- ARDL Estimation NZ Inflation Expectations  
 Full Sample Pre-ZLB (1994M1-2009M03) Proximal ZLB(2009M04-2017M06) 
Panel A: Short Run Estimates  
Variables  Coefficient Prob. Variables Coefficient Prob. Variables Coefficient Prob. 
𝐸𝜋𝑡−1 -0.294* 0.000 𝐸𝜋𝑡−1 -0.308* 0.000 𝐸𝜋𝑡−1 -0.365* 0.006 
𝑂𝑃𝑡−1
+  0.223* 0.000 𝑂𝑃𝑡−1
+  0.324* 0.000 𝑂𝑃𝑡−1
+  -0.015 0.873 
𝑂𝑃𝑡−1
−  0.274* 0.000 𝑂𝑃𝑡−1
−  0.409* 0.000 𝑂𝑃𝑡−1
−  -0.041 0.719 
𝜋𝑡−1 0.046* 0.000 𝜋𝑡−1 0.013 0.355 𝜋𝑡−1 0.033 0.341 
𝑀𝑆𝑡−1 0.0006 0.276 𝑀𝑆𝑡−1 0.001 0.066 𝑀𝑆𝑡−1 0.006* 0.006 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−1 0.0005 0.912 ˟𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−1 -0.0005 0.922 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−1 -0.062 0.111 
𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡−1 -0.011 0.267 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡−1 -0.016 0.359 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡−1 0.299* 0.001 
𝐹𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑡−1 2.95E-11 0.310 ˟𝐹𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑡−1 1.73E-10** 0.045 𝐹𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑡−1 1.13E-10** 0.048 
𝐸𝑋𝑡−1 -0.371* 0.000 ˟𝐸𝑋𝑡−1 -0.573* 0.000 ˟𝐸𝑋𝑡−1 0.491 0.217 
∆𝐸𝜋𝑡−1 0.154* 0.007 ∆𝐸𝜋𝑡−1 0.109 0.120 ∆𝐸𝜋𝑡−1 -0.114 0.301 
∆𝐸𝜋𝑡−2 -0.011 0.837 ∆𝐸𝜋𝑡−2 -0.035 0.597 ∆𝐸𝜋𝑡−2 -0.118 0.247 
∆𝐸𝜋𝑡−3 0.279* 0.000 ∆𝐸𝜋𝑡−3 0.133** 0.040 ∆𝐸𝜋𝑡−3 0.304* 0.002 
                                                          
13 Though the inflation and GDP for New Zealand and inflation expectation, unemployment, GDP and fiscal 
deficit/surplus for UK were stationary even at level. We also did the unit-root testing on the sub-periods and the 
series were either stationary at level or first difference. To conserve the space the results are not presented here 
but can be made available upon request.  
14 Note, 2.5% can be considered proximal ZLB based on recognition in standard discourse and analysis of 
monetary policy and with reference to historic contrast. However, this is substantively different in terms of 
quantity if not significance from the UK case, where the base rate has varied between 0.25 and 0.75 with 
consistency around 0.5% beginning March 2009.  Indeed, since April 2009 the Official Cash rates did show 
some movement i.e. initial increase to 3.5% and then decrease to 1.5% but this change remained around the 
proximal ZLB of 2.5% which we are considering in context of historical stance of Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand.   
∆𝑂𝑃𝑡
+ 0.081 0.473 ∆𝐸𝜋𝑡−4 -0.079 0.245 ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡
+ 0.057 0.830 
∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1
+  0.060 0.620 ∆𝐸𝜋𝑡−5 -0.129** 0.057 ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1
+  0.310 0.245 
∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−2
+  -0.272* 0.022 ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡
+ 0.036 0.817 ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−2
+  0.115 0.673 
∆𝜋𝑡 0.083* 0.012 ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1
+  -0.085 0.605 ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−3
+  -0.096 0.707 
∆𝜋𝑡−1 -0.167* 0.000 ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−2
+  -0.459* 0.006 ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−4
+  -0.149 0.519 
∆𝜋𝑡−2 0.176* 0.000 ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡
− 0.198 0.165 ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−5
+  0.668* 0.002 
∆𝜋𝑡−3 -0.002 0.941 ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1
−  -0.119 0.433 ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡
− -0.086 0.656 
∆𝜋𝑡−4 -0.042 0.322 ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−2
−  -0.044 0.766 ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1
−  0.116 0.450 
∆𝜋𝑡−5 -0.046 0.182 ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−3
−  -0.504* 0.000 ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−2
−  0.404 0.057 
∆𝑀𝑆𝑡  0.001 0.192 ∆𝜋𝑡 0.049 0.248 ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−3
−  0.298 0.169 
∆𝑀𝑆𝑡−1 -0.002* 0.003 ∆𝜋𝑡−1 -0.158* 0.001 ∆𝜋𝑡 -0.063 0.263 
∆𝑀𝑆𝑡−2 -0.0003 0.698 ∆𝜋𝑡−2 0.256* 0.000 ∆𝑀𝑆𝑡 0.0002 0.883 
∆𝑀𝑆𝑡−3 -0.0021* 0.019 ∆𝑀𝑆𝑡 0.003* 0.008 ∆𝑀𝑆𝑡−1 -0.008* 0.001 
∆𝑀𝑆𝑡−4 0.0015 0.089 ∆𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡  0.110 0.365 ∆𝑀𝑆𝑡−2 -0.006* 0.001 
∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 0.008 0.578 ∆𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡−1 -0.493* 0.001 ∆𝑀𝑆𝑡−3 -0.007* 0.000 
∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−1 -0.004 0.769 ∆𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡−2 0.439* 0.001 ∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡  -0.093 0.068 
∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−2 -0.039* 0.018 ∆𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡−3 0.274** 0.042 ∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−1 0.113** 0.037 
∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−3 0.043* 0.004 ∆𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡−4 -0.528* 0.006 ∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−2 -0.081* 0.001 
∆𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡  0.087 0.309 ∆𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡−5 0.375* 0.001 ∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−3 -0.015 0.780 
∆𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡−1 -0.324* 0.003 Constant  3.441* 0.000 ∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−4 0.182* 0.001 
∆𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡−2 0.381* 0.000    ∆𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡  0.0951 0.501 
∆𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡−3 0.081 0.411    ∆𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡−1 -0.332** 0.029 
∆𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡−4 -0.401* 0.000    ∆𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡−2 0.137 0.234 
∆𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡−5 0.289* 0.000    ∆𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡−3 -0.105 0.439 
∆𝐹𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑡 1.32E-10 0.602    ∆𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡−4 -0.223 0.079 
∆𝐹𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑡−1 - 4.91E-10 0.112    ∆𝐹𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑡 3.22E-11 0.923 
∆𝐹𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑡−2 6.38E-10* 0.037    ∆𝐹𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑡−1 -7.01E-10** 0.050 
∆𝐹𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑡−3 -4.51E-10 0.083    ∆𝐹𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑡−2 3.21E-10 0.360 
∆𝐸𝑋𝑡 0.399 0.169    ∆𝐹𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑡−3 -9.89E-10E 0.002 
Constant 2.410* 0.000    Constant -3.101 0.193 
         
Panel B: Long-run Estimates  
𝑂𝑃+  0.759* 0.000 1.051* 0.000 -0.043 0.873 
𝑂𝑃− 0.933* 0.000 1.326* 0.000 -0.112 0.724 
𝜋 0.158* 0.000 0.043 0.262 0.091 0.297 
MS 0.002 0.313 0.005** 0.048 0.017** 0.028 
GDP 0.001 0.913 -0.001 0.916 -0.170 0.120 
Unemp. -0.040 0.214 -0.054 0.296 0.818** 0.026 
𝐹𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙 1.00E-10 0.288 5.60E-10** 0.023 3.08E-10 0.087 
EX -1.260* 0.00 -1.856* 0.000 1.343 0.284 
Panel C: Diagnostic Test  
R2 0.980  0.974  0.993  
DW 2.003  1.965  1.946  
ECT -0.294* 0.000 -0.308* 0.000 -0.365* 0.000 
JB test. 13.945* 0.009 0.483 0.785 1.053 0.590 
BG LM test 1.161 0.559 0.460 0.794 0.831 0.659 
BPG test  61.712* 0.019 65.264* 0.000 45.264 0.298 
Harvey test 43.661 0.359 47.770** 0.027 47.239 0.230 
Ramsey 
REST Test 0.149429 0.824 
0.452 0.502 1.419 0.239 
*1% level of significance ** 5% level of significance ***10% level of significance, ˟ interpreted as 𝑧𝑡 = 𝑧𝑡−1 + ∆𝑧 
whereas the JB is Jarque-Bera test for the error normality. BG is Breusch-Godfrey LM test with two lags for auto-
correlation, BPG is Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey Test and White-test were used for heteroskedastic. Note: White 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance. Optimal lag selection based on AIC.  
The estimation results for the full period for New Zealand show that in the short-run, the lagged values 
for inflation expectations 𝐸𝜋𝑡−1 had a negative and statistically significant impact on inflation 
expectations. This is prima facie evidence of adaptive expectations and the adjustment of inflation 
expectations due to past deviations. In the short run, positive oil shocks 𝑂𝑃𝑡
+ had a positive impact on 
inflation expectations, and negative oil shocks 𝑂𝑃𝑡
− also had a positive impact on inflation expectations. 
However, the positive shocks  ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡
+ were greater in magnitude than the negative oil price shocks ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡
− 
suggesting price stickiness. This confirms what is otherwise intuitive.  
Moving on, inflation, GDP and money supply had positive impacts, which varied in magnitude and 
significance over different lags. Unemployment and fiscal consolidation exhibit negative impacts, 
which become more pronounced with lags. The real effective exchange rate also showed a significant 
lagged impact - negative one period - although the short-term impact was, by contrast, positive and this 
is consistent with the concept of a J-curve. The long-run estimates for the full period presented in Panel 
B establish that a positive oil shock had a positive impact on inflation expectations, and negative oil 
shocks also had a positive impact, indicating an asymmetric relationship between oil prices and 
inflation expectations over the duration for New Zealand. Other relations were of less relevance. 
Diagnostic testing reported in Panel C suggests that there were no issues of autocorrelation or 
heteroscedasticity and the negative and significant values of the Error Correction Term (ECT) indicate 
the stability of the model. Finally, the Ramsey REST Test indicates that the null of no misspecification 
could not be rejected at the 5% statistical level of significance. As such, the model passes standard 
testing.  
If we now look to the sub-period analysis, divided at the point of implementation of proximal ZLB, the 
estimation results of the first and second sub-period show that inflation expectations 𝐸𝜋𝑡 were 
negatively but significantly affected by one period lagged values indicating adaptive expectations and 
adjustments. This follows a similar form to the full sample. Interestingly, in the first sub-period, both 
positive and negative oil shocks 𝑂𝑃𝑡
+ and 𝑂𝑃𝑡
−  had a positive impact on inflation expectations. 
However, in the second sub-period, the relation changed, exhibitng a negative impact, suggesting that 
oil prices have a greater deflationary impact in a context of proximal ZLB conditions. It should also be 
clear that short term coefficients for positive (∆𝑂𝑃𝑡
+) and negative ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡
− oil price shocks varied with 
lags but showed positive and negative impacts overall. Our later impact multiplier analysis (see Figure 
2) provides further contextual significance for this.  
Table 3 establishes that unemployment has greater negative impact on inflation expectations in the 
second sub-period suggesting that unemployment may have greater deflationary impact on inflation 
expectations when monetary policy is approaching ZLB. The money supply had a positive impact on 
inflation expectations in both sub-periods, though the impact was more pronounced and statistically 
significant in the second sub-period. Conversely, the real effective exchange rate exhibits a negative 
impact on inflation expectations in the first sub-period, and this reduces in significance for the second 
sub-period. The long run estimates for both sub periods suggest that oil price shocks had positive 
impacts on inflation expectations in the first sub-period while in the second sub-period the impact was 
negative (though the results were only significant in the first sub-period).15 Interestingly, the exchange 
rate appreciation showed a negative impact on inflation expectations in the first sub-period. However, 
in the latter period the impact became positive and insignificant. This implies that the exchange rate 
                                                          
15 Inter alia, inflation and money supply had positive impact on inflation expectation in both period though only 
the latter had statistically significant impact. GDP has negative but insignificant impact, while unemployment has 
negative and insignificant impacts on inflation expectations in the first sub-period and positive impact in the 
second.  
loses its ability to influence expectations in proximal ZLB conditions. We comment more on cumulative 
findings in the conclusion. 
As with the full period, diagnostic testing performed for both sub-periods showed a significant value 
for the ECT. The Jarque-Bera test suggests that the null of normality of errors, no auto correlation and 
no misspecifications were not rejected at the standard statistical level of significance. To further test the 
stability of the estimates, we also performed the CUSUM and CUSUMSQ and the results are presented 
for the full and sub-samples in Figure 1 (See Appendix). 
The CUSUM and CUSUMSQ parameter stability tests for inflation expectations show that for both the 
full and sub-periods the CUSUM and CUSUMSQ remained between the 5% significance bounds. 
Interestingly, the second sub-period did show comparatively higher oscillations. The CUSUM graph is 
sub-zero, though still in the significance bound, indicating the stability of estimates. Following stability 
tests, we estimate the multiplier impact of oil prices shocks on inflation expectations. The results of N-
ARDL multiplier analysis are presented in Figure 2: 
Full Sample  
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Figure 2: NARDL Multiplier of Oil Shocks and response of Inflation Expectations in the NZ 
 
The results of the multiplier test for oil shocks on inflation expectation for New Zealand provide 
interesting results. In response to a 1% increase in oil prices inflation expectations showed a positive 
response in the full period as well as both sub-periods. Similarly, in response to negative oil price shocks 
inflation expectations showed a negative response in all of the periods. However, the second sub-period 
showed that responsiveness of inflation expectations to oil price shocks decreases in proximal ZLB 
conditions. In conjunction with earlier presented estimates the implication is that although inflation 
expectations are perennially influenced by oil price shocks, in proximal ZLB conditions expectations 
converge more promptly after oil shocks (see Figure 2 2nd period). We now move on to apply our N-
ARDL framework to the UK case. 
 
4.3 United Kingdom   
We begin with bounds testing to determine the presence of co-integration. The results are presented in 
Table 4: 
Table 4: Bounds test for the Nonlinear Cointegration United Kingdom (1999M1-2018M06) 
Dependent variable  F-statistics Lower-Bound (95%) Upper-Bound (95%) Conclusion  
Inflation Expectations (𝐸𝜋) 4.879* 2.17 3.21 Cointegration 
*1% level of significance ** 5% level of significance ***10% level of significance:  Null hypothesis is that there 
is no cointegration i.e. 𝐻0 ∶ 𝛽1 = 𝛽2 = 𝛽3 = 𝛽4 = 𝛽5 = 𝛽6 = 𝛽7 = 𝛽8 = 𝛽9 = 0, whereas the alternative 
hypothesis is that there is cointegration i.e. 𝐻1 ∶ 𝛽1 = 𝛽2 = 𝛽3 = 𝛽4 = 𝛽5 = 𝛽6 = 𝛽7 = 𝛽8 = 𝛽9 ≠ 0.  
As with New Zealand, bounds testing indicates the presence of co-integration, with the same inference. 
As such, we proceeded to the estimate based on N-ARDL and, following the same format as previously 
the results for the full and sub-periods are presented in Table 5:   
Table 5 Nonlinear- ARDL Estimation UK Inflation Expectations  
 Full Sample Pre-ZLB (1999M1-2009M03) Proximal ZLB(2009M04-2018M06) 
Panel A: Short Run Estimates  
Variables  Coefficient Prob. Variables Coefficient Prob. Variables Coefficient Prob. 
𝐸𝜋𝑡−1 -0.132* 0.000 𝐸𝜋𝑡−1 -0.181* 0.000 𝐸𝜋𝑡−1 -0.088** 0.045 
𝑂𝑃𝑡−1
+  0.036** 0.065 𝑂𝑃𝑡−1
+  0.044 0.237 𝑂𝑃𝑡−1
+  -0.059 0.437 
𝑂𝑃𝑡−1
−  0.049** 0.029 𝑂𝑃𝑡−1
−  0.073 0.255 𝑂𝑃𝑡−1
−  0.001 0.979 
𝜋𝑡−1 0.035* 0.006 ˟𝜋𝑡−1 0.054* 0.006 𝜋𝑡−1 -0.022 0.3777 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−1 0.009 0.154 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−1 0.010 0.166 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−1 0.039 0.503 
˟𝑀𝑆𝑡−1 0.0002 0.0669 ˟𝑀𝑆𝑡−1 0.002 0.108 𝑀𝑆𝑡−1 0.0007 0.636 
˟𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡−1 -0.001 0.086 ˟𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡−1 -0.003* 0.003 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡−1 0.003 0.380 
𝐸𝑋𝑡−1 -0.478* 0.001 ˟𝐸𝑋𝑡−1 -1.156* 0.000 𝐸𝑋𝑡−1 -0.834* 0.019 
𝐹𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑡−1 3.68E-06* 0.001 ˟𝐹𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑡−1 3.68E-07 0.851 ˟𝐹𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑡−1 3.59E-06* 0.008 
∆𝐸𝜋𝑡−1 0.741* 0.000 ∆𝐸𝜋𝑡−1 0.610* 0.000 ∆𝐸𝜋𝑡−1 0.660* 0.000 
∆𝐸𝜋𝑡−2 -0.048 0.533 ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡
+ -0.166 0.329 ∆𝐸𝜋𝑡−2 -0.036 0.748 
∆𝐸𝜋𝑡−3 -0.235* 0.002 ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡
− 0.594* 0.000 ∆𝐸𝜋𝑡−3 -0.562* 0.000 
∆𝐸𝜋𝑡−4 0.269* 0.000 ∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 -0.064** 0.49 ∆𝐸𝜋𝑡−4 0.416* 0.000 
∆𝐸𝜋𝑡−5 -0.112 0.070 Constant 5.910* 0.005 ∆𝐸𝜋𝑡−5 -0.122 0.199 
∆𝑂𝑃𝑡
+ -0.078 0.540    ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡
+ 0.021 0.893 
∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1
+  0.221 0.080    ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1
+  -0.246 0.134 
∆𝑂𝑃𝑡
− 0.0428* 0.000    ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡
− 0.039 0.777 
∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1
−  -0.059 0.641    ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1
−  0.193 0.228 
∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−2
−  0.238** 0.023    ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−2
−  0.184 0.221 
∆𝜋𝑡 0.033 0.098    ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−3
−  0.058 0.685 
∆𝜋𝑡−1 0.012 0.541    ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−4
−  -0.251 0.068 
∆𝜋𝑡−2 -0.036 0.073    ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−5
−  0.333** 0.018 
∆𝜋𝑡−3 0.016 0.375    ∆𝜋𝑡 -0.012 0.645 
∆𝜋𝑡−4 -0.045** 0.020    ∆𝜋𝑡−1 0.089* 0.000 
∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 0.026 0.496    ∆𝜋𝑡−2 0.004 0.870 
∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−1 -0.080** 0.039    ∆𝜋𝑡−3 0.060* 0.009 
∆𝐸𝑋𝑡 -1.0378* 0.002    ∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡  -0.103 0.219 
Constant 2.55* 0.005    ∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−1 -0.071 0.369 
      ∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−2 -0.026 0.745 
      ∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−3 -0.260* 0.002 
      𝛥𝑀𝑆𝑡 -0.003 0.080 
      ∆𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡  0.0004 0.920 
      ∆𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡−1 0.001 0.784 
      ∆𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡−2 -0.004 0.374 
      ∆𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡−3 -0.001 0.839 
      ∆𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡−4 -0.009** 0.032 
      ∆𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡−5 -0.005 0.157 
      ∆𝐸𝑋𝑡 -0.445 0.284 
      ∆𝐸𝑋𝑡−1 0.530 0.221 
      ∆𝐸𝑋𝑡−2 0.954** 0.027 
      Constant 4.265* 0.001 
Panel B: Long-run Estimates  
𝑂𝑃+  0.276** 0.044 0.243 0.201 -0.677 0.556 
𝑂𝑃− 0.376* 0.014 0.401 0.249 0.020 0.979 
𝜋 0.266* 0.000 0.300* 0.006 -0.254 0.499 
GDP 0.069 0.189 0.057 0.170 0.446 0.442 
MS 0.002 0.661 0.011 0.122 0.008 0.643 
Unemp. -0.007** 0.046 -0.018* 0.000 0.037 0.348 
EX -3.619* 0.001 -6.357* 0.000 -9.478 0.141 
𝐹𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙 2.78E-05* 0.000 2.02E-06 0.852 4.08E-05 0.172 
 
R2 0.989  0.985  0.996  
DW 2.059  2.005  1.927  
ECT -0.132* 0.000 -0.181* 0.000 -0.088* 0.000 
JB test. 185.677* 0.000 13.917* 0.000 1.486 0.475 
BG LM test 1.501 0.220 0.260 0.864 0.932 0.627 
BPG test  59.311* 0.000 51.683* 0.000 44.451 0.289 
Harvey test 36.230 0.110 29.324* 0.005 29.995 0.133 
Ramsey 
REST Test    0.875 0.350 
0.103 0.748 0.032 0.857 
*1% level of significance ** 5% level of significance ***10% level of significance, ˟ interpreted as 𝑧𝑡 = 𝑧𝑡−1 + ∆𝑧 
whereas the JB is Jarque-Bera test for the error normality. BG is Breusch-Godfrey LM test with two lags for auto-
correlation, BPG is Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey Test and White-test were used for heteroskedastic. Note: White 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance. Optimal lag selection based on AIC.   
If we begin from the full period results, our estimation results indicate that in the short-run, the lagged 
values of inflation expectations 𝐸𝜋𝑡−1 had a negative and statistically significant impact on inflation 
expectations. This outcome is similar to New Zealand and tends to confirm the general association. 
Notably, the short run coefficients of inflation expectations ∆𝐸𝜋𝑡  also showed considerable impact 
which varied with lags, implying elements of adaptive inflation expectations. The one period lagged 
positive oil shocks 𝑂𝑃𝑡
+ had a positive impact on inflation expectations, whilst the negative 𝑂𝑃𝑡
+ also 
had a positive impact on inflation expectations. Importantly, the short-run coefficients establish positive 
shocks  ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡
+ were greater in magnitude than negative oil price shocks ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡
− , again suggesting price 
stickiness. This also confirms the general trend association suggested in the New Zealand case, and is 
of course, likewise intuitive.  
Moving on, careful scrutiny of Table 4 highlights that inflation, GDP, money supply and fiscal (surplus) 
had positive impacts that varied in magnitude and significance over different lags. Unemployment and 
the real effective exchange rate exhibit negative impacts. The REER estimates suggest a very strong 
pass-through to inflation expectations. The long-run estimates for the full period (Panel B) indicate that 
positive oil shocks had a positive impact on inflation expectations while negative oil shocks also had a 
positive impact. Once more this confirms the association found in the New Zealand case. That is, an 
indication of an asymmetric relationship between oil prices and inflation expectations.16 Overall, 
diagnostic testing (Panel C) suggests that there were no issues of autocorrelation or heteroskedasticity. 
The negative and significant values for ECT also indicate stability of the model and the Ramsey REST 
test establishes once more that the model passes standard testing.  
The results for the first and second sub-period also indicate that adaptive expectations were operative. 
Inflation expectations 𝐸𝜋𝑡 were negatively but significantly affected by the one period lagged values 
and so adjustments allow us to infer adaptive expectations. Interestingly, in the first sub-period, both 
positive and negative oil shocks 𝑂𝑃𝑡
+ and 𝑂𝑃𝑡
−  had a positive impact on inflation expectations. 
However, in the second sub-period, one period lagged positive oil price shocks (𝑂𝑃𝑡−1
+ ) had a negative 
impact, while a negative oil shock (𝑂𝑃𝑡−1
− ) had a positive impact. The short-term coefficients of oil 
price changes ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡  exhibited diminishing impacts in the second period – and so this was the case 
during a proximal ZLB situation.  
If we consider other variables from Table 4, inflation, GDP, money supply and fiscal stance 
(surplus/deficit) exhibit positive impacts with lags. Unemployment had a contemporaneous positive and 
insignificant impact which lags changed to negative and significant. The real effective exchange rate 
had a strong negative impact suggesting that appreciation can have very strong deflationary impact on 
inflation expectations. This is rarely discussed in the literature. The first-sub period long-run estimates 
(Panel B) show that oil prices (𝑂𝑃+ & 𝑂𝑃−), inflation, GDP, money supply, and fiscal consolidation 
have positive impacts, while unemployment and REER demonstrate negative impacts on inflation 
expectations. In the second period, positive oil shocks(𝑂𝑃+), inflation and REER had negative impacts, 
though the results lacked statistical significance.  
Overall, the diagnostic tests establish some signs of heteroscedasticity for the first sub-period. However, 
there was no issue of autocorrelation or misspecification. Given we are employing a White approach 
                                                          
16 Among the other variables, money supply GDP, money supply and fiscal consolidation had positive impacts 
and unemployment and REER had negative impacts on inflation expectations. 
coefficient covariance matrix, able to account for heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & 
covariance, this is not a major issue from a statistical adequacy perspective. In any case, in the second 
sub-period, the diagnostic tests indicate no sign of heteroskedasticity or autocorrelation and the model 
passed specification testing.  
Following the same methodological approach applied to New Zealand by performing parameter 
stability tests for the periods and this is set out in Figure 3 (See appendix) 
The CUSUM and CUSUMSQ parameter stability test for inflation establish that, aside from some 
temporary transgression in the first sub-period, our estimates for the full as well as sub-samples are 
stable. We estimate the multiplier effects of inflation expectations on inflation and the results are 
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Figure 4: NARDL Multiplier of Oil Shocks and response of Inflation expectations in the UK  
The results of the multiplier test of oil shocks on inflation expectations for the UK are interesting. In 
response to a 1% increase in oil prices inflation expectations demonstrate a positive response in the full 
period, which materialised after some lags. Similarly, in repose to negative oil price shocks inflation 
expectations showed a negative response in the full period. Thereafter, when we performed the sub-
periods analysis, the positive oil shocks had a positive impact on the inflation with lag in the first sub-
period. However, a positive oil shock did not have a positive impact, but rather a negative impact on 
inflation expectations in the second period. A negative oil price shock had a negative impact in both 
sub-periods. Furthermore, the responsiveness of inflation expectations to oil price shocks decreased in 
the second sub-period, and hence when monetary policy was in a proximal ZLB situation.  
 
These findings in conjunction with the earlier presented N-ARDL estimates suggest that although 
inflation expectations have been influenced by oil prices shocks throughout the full period, in the 
proximal ZLB period the pressure on inflation expectations is perhaps best characterised as involving 
downward or deflationary risks to price stability.  
 
5. Conclusion and Policy Implications  
Central bank inflation targeting to achieve price stability has become a standard practice. Intuitively, 
policy strategy involves acknowledging a link between inflation and inflationary expectations.  There 
is, therefore, an issue of anchoring. A proximal situation of ZLB interest rates poses an important set of 
challenges for monetary policy and price stability. In this study we focused on New Zealand and the 
UK as two longstanding inflation targeting policy regimes. We have analysed the implication of core 
factors affecting inflation expectations in an empirical framework designed to explore nonlinearities 
and asymmetries in the association between variables of interest. One key finding is that the real 
effective exchange rate has significant impacts on inflation expectations and this is indicative of an 
exchange rate pass-through to inflation via an inflation expectations channel. This is a relatively under-
explored or researched avenue for statistical analysis and debate17.   
                                                          
17 Though in all fairness, we must acknowledge that in their seminal work, Engel and West (2005) did reflect on 
predictability of fundamentals including money supply, inflation, interest rates and output by the exchange rate 
dynamics.  
More generally, our empirical results lead us to conclude that inflation, money supply, GDP, 
unemployment, the exchange rate and fiscal stance all have significant implications for inflation 
expectations. Inflation expectations are also influenced by their past behaviour and hence, there is 
considerable evidence to infer adaptive inflation expectations. As such, anchoring is clearly operative. 
This remained the case in the proximal-ZLB period for both countries.  
However, we found oil shock asymmetries in the response of inflation expectations in both the first and 
second periods. In the case of New Zealand, inflation expectations showed a positive response to 
increasing oil prices in the full as well as both sub-periods. In response to negative oil price shocks 
inflation expectations showed a negative response in both periods. However, the responsiveness of 
inflation expectations to oil price shocks decreased in the second sub-period. The implication is that in 
a proximal ZLB situation expectations converge more promptly to oil shocks. By contrast, in the case 
of the UK, oil price shocks affected inflation expectations with lags and there was symmetric association 
between oil price shocks and inflation expectations. However, asymmetries emerge in the sub-period 
analysis. Furthermore, inflation expectations response to oil price shocks decreased in the proximal 
ZLB period. Overall, in the case of the UK, inflation expectations were influenced by oil price shocks 
in the full period, but in a proximal ZLB situation, to reiterate, the pressure on inflation expectations is 
perhaps best characterised as involving downward or deflationary risks to price stability.  
 
As a final point and as a trigger for future research. One ought also to consider the combination of ZLB 
conditions and the effects created by quantitative easing, since it is ultimately self-limiting to consider 
the former in the absence of the latter. It is widely recognized that QE raised the price and lowered the 
yield on government bonds in policy applying countries. This in turn has fed through to lower long term 
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Figure 3. CUSUM and CUSUMSQ Parameter Stability Test for Inflation Expectation in the UK 
 
